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Project Monitoring and Banking Competition under Adverse Selection
by Vesa Kanniainen and Rune Stenbacka
*
We develop an analysis of ex ante monitoring of risky projects in banking. If protected
from competition, banks are more concerned about not catching good risk projects when
the perceived state of the economy improves, while they are more concerned about
being induced to finance bad risk projects when conditions deteriorate. A monopoly
bank provides the socially optimal ex ante monitoring of good risks, but is too
conservative with regard to bad risks. Competition between banks is shown to
undermine the incentives to avoid decision errors regarding both good and bad risk
projects providing too limited monitoring effort from society's point of view.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Projektsteuerung und Bankenwettbewerb bei adverser Selektion
In dem Beitrag wird ein Modell zur Auswahl von risikobehafteten Projekten durch
Banken entwickelt. Wenn Banken vor Wettbewerb geschützt werden, dann legen sie
unter guten wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen mehr Wert darauf sich keine Projekte mit
gutem Risiko entgehen zu lassen, wohingegen sie, wenn sich die Bedingungen ver-
schlechtern eher darauf achten keine schlechten Projekte zu finanzieren. Eine monopoli-
stische Bank leistet die sozial-optimale Auswahl guter Risiken, aber die Selektion ist zu
konservativ im Hinblick auf schlechte Risiken. Es wird gezeigt, daß Wettbewerb
zwischen den Banken dazu führt, daß die Anreize fehlerhafte Entscheidung zu
vermeiden sowohl im Hinblick auf  Projekte mit guten als auch für Projekte mit
schlechten Risiken zu gering sind. Die gesellschaftliche Wohlfahrt sinkt, weil Banken
zu wenig in Projektauswahl investieren.
                                                
*  The authors acknowledge the financial support of the Research Foundation of the Cooperative
Banks (Osuuspankkiryhmän Tutkimussäätiö) and helpful comments on the preliminary draft by
Gerhard Clemenz.I. Introduction
In the aftermath of the financial crises, experienced earlier in several western
countries and more recently in Southeast Asia, the issue of how the lending market
structure affects the banks' risk exposure is at the center of economic discussion. Many
observers have questioned the incentives of the private banking industry to adequately
evaluate projectholders' risks suggesting that these incentives may be sensitive to the
business cycles as well as to the market structure in the banking industry. Such a financial
crisis took place in the USA in the 1980s and Japan is facing its crisis in the 1990s without
ignoring that many European banks have also experienced financial distress during the last
decade. The most severe banking crisis in the monetary history of the Scandinavian
countries has recently generated exceptionally high credit losses and bad debts.
1 The crises
emerged not long after thoroughgoing deregulation of the banking industries in these
countries. In light of this experience, more research effort should evidently be directed to
the question whether private banks have sufficient incentives to invest in project-specific
ex ante monitoring and in what way these incentives are related to the nature of
competition in banking. This issue is addressed in the current paper.
One should also ask how the monitoring effort of banks is related to
undiversifiable economy-wide risks at the macro level? We should highlight the fact that
the seeds of for example the Scandinavian banking crises were laid in the 1980s, during a
period which was understood to be a period of steady macroeconomic growth and
optimistic expectations of the future states of the economies. Is it thus plausible that
optimistic expectations reduce the incentives for banks to defray costly monitoring effort
and thereby engage in excessive risk-taking? What exactly is the relationship between the
undiversifiable risks and the incentives of banks to become engaged in project-specific
monitoring?
In light of the existing theory of banking, explanations are hard to find. It is
not sufficiently well understood how risky finance gets allocated through the banking
system and in which way banks evaluate economic risks.
2 Our focus in this paper will be
on ex ante incentives of evaluating risks properly instead of exploring the banking crises
from an ex post perspective. The ultimate question "what's different about banks?"2
continues to be a most fundamental question. This is the question raised by Fama (1985)
who suggested that the fundamental output of a banking firm is information. This view
should not come as a surprise given the earlier studies dating back to the 1970s which
have suggested that informational asymmetries limit banks' ability to sign first-best
contracts with their customers. One is tempted to suggest that the failure of banks to
produce the required information about private projects lies at the heart of the recent
banking crises.
It is an established approach to view banks as financial intermediaries which
economize on costs of monitoring on behalf of depositors (Diamond (1984)). In an
important branch of the literature, the idea of costly state verification (Townsend (1979),
Gale and Hellwig (1985), Williamson (1986)) has pointed to the banks' role in the ex post
monitoring of contracts which determine the sharing of risky returns. Monitoring of such a
type, however, limits the bank's role to the act of finding out whether correct information
has been provided by the firm regarding the state of nature after resolution of uncertainty.
There are other aspects of monitoring that appear to be important for the theory of
financial intermediaries. The ex ante costs of information acquisition certainly represent
one such aspect. The important question therefore is how successful banks are in screening
and monitoring credit applications ex ante. Such ex ante monitoring is necessary if the
projectholders do not have credible means, such as sufficient collateral, of signaling their
type to financiers. It is reasonable to view the intermediaries as institutions which possess
a comparative advantage in ex ante monitoring.
It is reasonable to view projectholders as having private information
regarding their projects compared to the information of banks or their depositors. The
banks thus face a fundamental problem of adverse selection, first properly analyzed by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and subsequently elaborated by Bester (1985), Clemenz (1986)
and Milde and Riley (1988) in various directions. To make sure, the literature on banks
and credit contracts has not left unrecognized the role of banks in providing ex ante
monitoring of risky investment projects. Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1986) introduced
the idea of optimal screening of bank's borrowers suggesting that the probability of loan
default is related to screening. Broecker (1990) also introduced the mechanism of credit
testing recognizing the fundamental property that competition in lending rates tends to3
reduce the average quality of loans. However, he assumed costless testing of loan
applicants (i.e. requiring no investment) with predetermined chance of evaluating risks
correctly, thus abstracting from the banks' monitoring decisions. Similarly, Riordan (1993)
has applied auction theory to the bank loan market and demonstrated how more intense
competition may damage market performance. Riordan's model, however, also focuses on
banks making funding decisions based on signals with exogenous statistical properties. In
Diamond (1991), there is a fixed cost of monitoring which provides random information;
the monitoring effort is not, however, endogenized. In the presence of costly screening,
Wang and Williamson (1994) have examined the optimality of debt contracts and shown
how debt contracts can serve as a screening mechanism whereby low-risk customers are
separated out from the pool of applicants. In their model, the bank can fully learn the type
of the customer. In Holmström and Tirole (1997), moral hazard makes the bank pay a
fixed cost of monitoring to reduce the incentives of projectholders for private rent-seeking.
Again, monitoring effort is not optimized. The idea of ex ante monitoring is also
introduced by Caminal and Matutes (1997) in a model of moral hazard where the bank
can, but need not, monitor the clients at stochastic cost.
3 In contrast to the previous
literature, we introduce costly but imperfect monitoring into a model where banks
optimally determine the classification errors. The idea of endogenizing lenders'
information acquisition and relating it to the market structure in the lending market has
earlier informally been suggested by Riordan (1993). Our paper introduces a formal
analysis of how the monitoring incentives of banks can be explained by structural features
such as the lending market structure as well as the state of the economy measured as
proportion of creditworthy projects. It also demonstrates an important property of rational
customer evaluation in banking: different monitoring intensities are required for the
optimal evaluation of good and bad risks. Within the framework of an analysis
independent and complementary relative to ours, Gehrig (1998) has recently developed a
model where banks can strategically adjust the characteristics of creditworthiness tests by
investing in a screening technology. With the screening intensity summarized by one
variable capturing signal quality, Gehrig provides conditions under which screening efforts
are reduced by competition. In such a case competition would cause the quality of overall
loan portfolios to decline making the economy incur higher risks.
The procedures of project-specific monitoring obviously relate to the market4
structure of the lending market as well as to the internal organization of banks. In a general
context, not restricted to loan markets, Sah and Stiglitz (1986) have earlier analyzed
alternative ways of organizing the selection of projects to be funded.
4 They compare the
quality of project selection within hierarchies and polyarchies from the point of view of
the two possible classification errors. There appears to be an analogy between their
approach and ours, but our focus is on the relationship between monitoring and the
external market structure rather than on issues of internal organization.
The Scandinavian experiences suggest that dilution of banks' interest in ex
ante monitoring coincides with mistaken beliefs about future economic conditions and the
radically changed nature of strategic competition in the post-deregulation period.
5 In the
present paper, we first characterize a bank's optimal investment in project-specific ex ante
monitoring in the absence of competing intermediaries. By monitoring we mean an ex ante
evaluation of a project intended to classify its future return distribution based on
processing information such as the projectholder's history and reputation, the firm's current
assets and its perceived competence as well as the nature of the industry in which the
projectholder operates. We view monitoring as an instrument for the bank to alleviate the
problem of asymmetric information. From the bank's point of view, access to a monitoring
technology is equivalent to access to inside information concerning the projectholders.
Investment in such a technology is taken to be costly for the bank, but is taken to lead to
improved judgement about the credit worthiness of each potential customer. Monitoring
is, however, an imperfect instrument in the sense that the bank will always be subject to
two kinds of decision errors.
The perceived state of the economy will be shown in our model to be one of
the key determinants of banking behavior. We establish some fundamental theorems of ex
ante monitoring. Firstly, a profit maximizing bank will become more concerned about
losing good risk projects when the perceived state of the economy becomes better, while it
becomes more concerned about being induced to finance bad risk projects when the
perceived state of the economy worsens. Secondly, as commitments to sharing of
customer-specific information cannot be regarded as credible, competition between banks
undermines the incentives to control both good and bad risks when compared to a bank
operating in the absence of competition, subject to the qualification that the lending rate5
competition is not too intense. Thus, our paper identifies a trade-off between the degree of
banking competition and the incentives for banks to acquire information. Competition is
detrimental to monitoring incentives, reducing the quality of customers and resulting in
higher average failure probability. Thirdly, the normative part of our analysis suggests an
important message from the point of view of what constitutes an optimal market structure
of the lending industry from the point of view of information acquisition. We will show
that a monopoly bank will provide a socially optimal amount of monitoring of good risks,
while introduction of competition into the monopoly market will reduce the monitoring
incentives. In fact, a banking duopoly will achieve a monitoring intensity which is
unambiguously insufficient from the social point of view. However, we find the monopoly
bank to be too conservative in its evaluation of bad risks investing too much in detection
of bad risks. In contrast, bank duopolists will typically underinvest in monitoring of bad
risks relative to the social optimum. Our analysis of competition in monitoring suggests a
welfare-improving role for coordination of monitoring activities of competing banks. As a
logical consequence, a jointly operated institution for credit evaluation would generate
unambiguous welfare gains relative to noncooperative monitoring competition.
Our study first outlines the model and the assumptions used in the analysis.
In section III, we provide a motivation for ex ante monitoring. In section IV, we focus on
optimal investments in monitoring on behalf of a bank operating in the absence of
competition. Section V provides an analysis of the impact of banking competition on
investment in project-specific monitoring. Section VI reports our welfare analysis. Finally,
we summarize and discuss some of the implications of our analysis in Section VII.
II. A Model with Costly and Imperfect Monitoring
We assume that there are N risky projects. They are taken to be of just two
types, low-risk (L) or high-risk (H). Each project requires one unit of funding. For our
purposes, it is useful to adopt the widely employed tradition by assuming that
projectholders do not have access to outside equity capital. The model is built so that
banks favor debt contracts and the projects will be fully financed by debt. Debt turns out to
be the optimal form of finance in the current context in the sense that there is no other6
contract type which could improve the outcome. To focus exclusively on the issues of ex
ante monitoring and selection of customers it is appropriate to abstract from collateral.
6
The deposit market is taken to be competitive at zero interest. We share the
assumption of riskless deposits with most models of lending markets. Alternatively, the
deposit insurance premium is assumed constant and taken to be zero.
7 We assume that a
project of type i (i=L,H) has a success probability pi and a corresponding return under
success, Ri, satisfying
Assumption 1.  pL > pH ;  pLRL > 1 > pHRH ;  RH ‡ RL > 1.
Such a return structure has been widely employed in the banking literature with its focus
on asymmetric information. Under failure, both types of projects generate a return of zero
and are protected by limited liability. It follows from Assumption 1 that pHRL < 1. The
expected net social value of an L-project is thus assumed to be positive while that of an H-
project is assumed to be negative. If the bank's lending rate is rB, the participation
constraint of an H-firm in terms of its expected profit reads as E[PH] = pH[RH-(1+rB)] ‡ 0.
Under this condition, the H-project is privately, though not socially, valuable. However,
under the participation constraint of the H-firm, the bank's expected profit from such a
firm will be E[pB
H] = pH(1+rB)-1 £ pHRH-1 < 0. It follows that it will be optimal for the
bank to finance L-projects only, trying to abstain from financing H-projects. The
projectholders of H-type, however, would have an incentive to raise finance; under a
failure, the H-types would be protected by the limited liability while under success they
would reap part of the upper tail of the probability distribution. Thus, our model exhibits
the well-known conflict of interests between the bank and the projectholders of type H.
Such a set up serves the purpose of analyzing normative issues related to project-specific
information acquisition within the banking industry.
The relative share of L-type loan applicants is assumed to be l. As the focus
of our paper is on project-specific evaluation of clients for idiosyncratic risks rather than
on banks' investigation of industry-wide or economy-wide risks, we assume that the bank
knows l.
8 Because of asymmetric information and in the absence of credible signaling, the
bank is unable to identify the type of the projectholder unless it invests ex ante in a7
technology facilitating monitoring of the loan applicant. But, even if the bank does so it
can hope for no more than imperfect signals in our model and we will work with the key
assumption that the precision of the bank's monitoring is an increasing function of the
resources directed towards these activities.
9
We build our model as follows. Initially, the bank obtains N loan
applications where l is the share of L-type applications. Without monitoring effort, the
bank cannot do better than assign a "label" to each application resorting only to its
knowledge of l. The bank can, however, do better. It has access to a monitoring
technology, though an imperfect and costly one. This means that fully correct
classification cannot be achieved except at infinite ex ante cost. Therefore, our model has
the property that even if the bank processes information, and hence is better able to
evaluate risky projects than are its depositors, its information continues to be more limited
than that of the projectholders. We will provide a theory of the optimal classification
errors a and b which are regarded as the decision variables of the bank, therefore telling
something about the quality of the bank's monitoring technology.
10
We define the resulting classification errors through conditional probabilities
as
 (1)    P(H‰L) = a ;  P(L‰H) = b.
Thus, a denotes the probability that an L-type project will be mis-classified as H while b
measures the probability that an H-type applicant gets mis-labelled as L. It follows that the
probabilities of correct classifications are P(L‰L) = 1-a and P(H‰H) = 1-b. To
summarize, we have for the pool of projects
  laN          projects of type L misclassified as H,
  l(1-a)N      projects of type L correctly classified as L,
  (1-l)bN      projects of type H misclassified as L,
  (1-l)(1-b)N  projects of type H correctly classified as H.
The perceived state of the economy, l, can be expected to interact with the
type of classification error the bank is most concerned with. Expecting a good state, the
bank might be more concerned about losing good risk projects (the a-error), though it is8
precisely the misjudgment of bad risks (b-error) which, in the bad state of nature, causes
the credit losses. Below we will establish that this intuition is correct.
Costs of monitoring are introduced through
Assumption 2.  A bank can invest ex ante in a monitoring technology. The cost of such an
investment, to be called cost of monitoring, is a decreasing, separable and convex function
of the classification errors a, b, and is given by a(a) + b(b), satisfying (A1)  a'(a) < 0,
a"(a) > 0  with the boundary conditions a(1-l) = 0, lima->0 a(a) = ¥, a'(1-l) = 0; (A2) 
b'(b) < 0, b"(b) > 0  with the boundary conditions b(l) = 0 and limb->0 b(b) = ¥, b'(l) =
0.
We thus follow Broecker (1990) by introducing test procedures to evaluate
the two types of decision errors but we endogenize the testing procedure. A natural
interpretation of our monitoring technology is that each customer is evaluated through two
different tests, one intended to detect a-errors and the other one to detect b-errors. Sah and
Stiglitz (1986) have already demonstrated how a- and b-type errors are linked to the
organization structure. In our model, the separation of a- and b-errors could be seen as a
result of organizational commitments whereby detection of the different errors is assigned
to different agencies within the organization. Also, our model will characterize the optimal
allocation of resources directed to detecting the two different types of classification errors.
Since, as we will see, it turns out that the classification errors have different
marginal impact on the bank's profits, it would not, in general, be optimal for the bank to
maintain equal monitoring intensities (a = b) with respect to both types of classification
errors. Our cost of monitoring shares the convexity property with the model of Chan,
Greenbaum and Thakor (1986), but in contrast to their analysis we assume that some of
the high-risk projects can be successfully screened out ex ante.
Assumptions (A1)-(A2) imply that perfect monitoring is not feasible, since it
would require infinite resources. If the bank assigns the labels randomly, rationally
exploiting only its prior information on l, it will face maximal classification errors
satisfying P(H‰L) = a0 = 1-l, P(L‰H) = b0 = l. To see this, note that the bank labels lN9
firms as L and (1-l)N as H. However, it understands that some applicants are
misclassified. It is rational to conclude that in the sub-group of the lN firms labelled as L
there are only l
2N L-firms and that (1-l)lN are H-firms. It follows that l(1-l)N of the L
firms also carry the H-label i.e. get mislabelled. Therefore (1-l)
2N of the truly H-firms get
labelled as H. Consequently, it must hold that P(L‰H) = l.
Given the bank's commitment to a particular monitoring effort (a,b), we
define two additional functions:
In (2), t(a,b) stands for the probability that firms which are classified as type
L indeed are of type L and r(a,b) is the probability that firms classified as type H indeed
are of type H respectively, conditional on the stated monitoring effort. It is reasonable to
think of t(a,b) as a measure of the quality relative to L-type classifications, while r(a,b)
denotes the quality applied to H-type classifications. We notice that l < t(a,b) < 1 and 1-l
< r(a,b) < 1. For subsequent purposes we notice ¶t/¶a = -l(1-t)/[l(1-a)+(1-l)b] < 0, and
¶r/¶b = -(1-l)t/[l(1-a)+(1-l)b] < 0; it also holds that ¶t/¶b < 0, ¶r/¶a < 0. It turns out
that the t-function, the ability to classify the good risks correctly, will play a key role in the
subsequent analysis; it is therefore important to highlight that a and b enter in a different
way in (2).
11 This finding emphasizes the importance of the technological assumptions of
our model, i.e. the separation of a- and b-risks.
In the next section we will review the bank's optimal interest rate policy in
the absence of monitoring. In particular, we demonstrate how information asymmetries
will generate adverse selection phenomena which can possibly make the credit market
break down.
(2)      ( , ) =  
(1- )
(1- )+(1- )









III. Why Ex Ante Monitoring?
Consider initially, if only as a benchmark case, the full information
equilibrium. Assume for a moment that the bank can fully verify the types of potential
projects; there are no informational asymmetries ex ante and no H-firm would be funded.
However, verifying the ex post state is assumed to be costly. In such a context, a debt
contract dominates over an equity contract because the debt contract provides social
benefits arising from economization on verification costs.
12 Since, and trivially, the bank's
expected profit is linear in rB, the interest rate on L-projects, it is optimal for the bank to
reap all the surplus from each project to itself subject to the participation constraint of the
projectholder.
If the projectholders cannot signal their type and if the bank is not engaged
in ex ante monitoring, there must be a pooling equilibrium under adverse selection
meaning a single interest rate. Debt contracts continue to be optimal: no projectholder has
an incentive to misreport (cf. Boyd and Smith (1993)). With equity financing, all projects
should be monitored ex post with a substantial social deadweight loss due to excessive
verification costs. If the bank chooses rB > RL-1, the participation constraint of the good
risk projects is violated and they drop out of the pool generating a severe adverse selection
problem. Thus, the interest rate serves as a self-selection mechanism, as suggested by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). It is optimal for the bank to charge the maximum interest rate at
which L-type projects accept the loan offer, rB = RL-1. At such an interest rate, the bank
will serve the entire market consisting of both types of projects.
Under debt contracts, project failures will be monitored ex post. We
introduce an ex post verification cost of monitoring a project declared to be a failure. Let c
> 0 denote such a verification cost. In the absence of ex ante monitoring, the expected
number of failures will be N[(1-pL)l + (1-pH)(1-l)]. The bank's expected profit will then
be
 (3)   E[pB(RL)] = N[l(pLRL - c(1-pL)) + (1-l)(RLpH - c(1-pH)) - 1].11
Instead of financing projects by debt, a bank could choose to be an
equityholder. In the current framework equity would not, however, provide the efficient
transmission of finance, because it would require all projects to be monitored ex post.
Equity is privately optimal for a bank, however, if the cost of monitoring ex post is small.
With equity financing, a bank would reap the whole surplus from successful high risk
projects providing a trade-off against cost savings in monitoring. It is easy to see from (3)
that the precise condition for debt to also privately dominate equity is given by cn(l,pL,pH)
> RH - RL, where n(l,pL,pH) = 1 + lpL/(1-l)pH with the properties that ¶n/¶pL > 0, ¶n/¶pH
< 0, ¶n/¶l > 0. It seems that such a feature has been left unnoticed in the literature as it has
mainly dealt with the verification issue in the absence of adverse selection. From this
condition on c, one can see that high return on bad risk projects under success will threaten
the optimality of debt contracts under adverse selection by potentially making equity more
attractive for the bank than debt. Further, as is well-known from the literature, debt is
always optimal if RH = RL. Below we work with the assumption that the cost of ex post
monitoring is sufficiently large to make debt privately optimal for the bank. For a bank to




13 From the point of view of the bank, the condition l > l
o
thus implies that it is better to finance all projects than to withdraw the lending activities
from the market. The credit market, however, breaks down if l < l
o, since it would not
then be worthwhile for the bank to operate. We have
Lemma 1. If l < l
o, the credit market breaks down in the absence of ex ante
monitoring.
14
If the credit market breaks down, the bank, however, has the option of
investing in monitoring. In the next section, we provide an analysis of the optimal
monitoring effort of a bank and we show that it will be in the bank's interest to invest in
monitoring ex ante. Thus, costly monitoring serves the social purpose of rescuing the
operation of a credit market dominated by high risk projects. As a matter of fact, the
incentive to monitor is linked to the value of l, as we will see below.12
IV. Optimal Investment In Monitoring
Consider ex ante monitoring where the bank commits itself to a monitoring
technology and where it can therefore condition its interest rate policy on the outcome of
its monitoring. If the credit classification were free of costs, the bank would be able to
fully separate projects and the credit market would allocate the funds in the first-best
manner. However, under costly monitoring, residual classification errors will remain.
Through its monitoring technology, a and b are decision variables for the bank. Thus,
based on its ex ante monitoring the bank can produce privately (and socially) valuable
information so that it can condition its decisions not only on l, but also on the values of
t(a,b) and r(a,b).
IV.1 Optimal Interest Rate Policy under Monitoring
We consider a risk-neutral bank. It is reasonable to view the bank's decision-
making as sequential in the sense that its interest rate decision will be conditioned on the
outcome of its monitoring. Given the monitoring investment (the values of a and b), the
bank will determine a lending rate which will be charged to projectholders.
Even though the bank would prefer to avoid funding of H-projects, it is able
to accomplish such a strategy only imperfectly. The bank tries to identify the L-firms and
screen out the H-type applicants, since these are the source of credit losses on average.
Because of imperfect monitoring the bank will face both types of classification error. Even
with ex ante monitoring, the pool of loan applicants consists of  (i) the truly L-firms
labelled as L,  (ii) some H-firms mis-labelled as L,  (iii) some L-firms mis-labelled as H,
and  (iv) the truly H-firms labelled as H. Groups (iii) and (iv) drop out of the market, not
being financed. It is easy to judge that the optimal lending rate for the bank is rB = RL-1 as
the profit function is linear in rB. Incorporating these effects on loan offers, we write the
bank's expected profit as
(4)     E[pB‰a,b] = N[l(1-a)+(1-l)b][(RL+c)G - 1 - c] - Na(a) - Nb(b),13
where we have introduced the notation G = pLt + pH(1-t) for the posterior success
probability and where N[l(1-a)+(1-l)b] gives the number of projects financed, i.e. the
number of projects classified as L-type. The last two terms in (4) represent the costs of
monitoring, capturing the idea that all applicants are monitored on an equal basis.
It is clear from (4) that for a bank to be operative, there must be a sufficient
proportion of good-risk projects, l, in the economy and these must generate a sufficiently
high expected return RL under success. Therefore, a monopoly bank which is engaged in
costly monitoring will offer a credit contract with lending rate RL-1 to all projectholders
classified as L; it will offer no loan contract to those classified as H.
IV.2 Optimal Monitoring
Knowledge of the bank's optimal interest rate policy allows us to solve
recursively for the optimal monitoring intensity. The solution will thereby satisfy the
requirement of time-consistency. Thus the monitoring intensities will be chosen in order to
solve maxa,b E[pB‰rB], obtained by substituting the optimal interest rate rB = RL-1 into the
objective function (4). Intuitively, the optimal commitment to a pair of monitoring
intensities (a
m,b
m) has the property that the expected marginal returns on monitoring are
equated with the corresponding ex ante marginal costs.
15
Consider first the a-decision. A reduction in a will, ceteris paribus, increase
the number of good risk projects correctly classified as L, l(1-a), as well as t (and hence
G), the posterior probability that those classified as L are indeed of the L-type. More loans
will be extended through this channel and both these effects tend to raise the expected
total and marginal return on monitoring effort. A reduction in b, however, will reduce (1-
l)b, the number of bad risk projects misclassified as L, but raise t (hence G), the posterior
probability that projects classified as L are indeed of type L. Fewer loans will be extended
through this channel, though at better odds. Therefore, the first effect tends to reduce the
expected total and marginal revenue from the marginal monitoring effort, while the latter
effect has the opposite effect in that it tends to raise it. In terms of expected marginal
revenue, there is an interesting but natural asymmetry. When the share of bad risks is high,
the b-monitoring is more effective than a-monitoring. Straightforward evaluation of14
expected returns on marginal monitoring effort shows that MR(a) = ¶TR/¶a = -
Nl[pL(RL+c)-(1+c)], MR(b) = ¶TR/¶b = N(1-l)[pH(RL+c)-(1+c)]. The marginal effect on




Lemma 2. The relative effectiveness of a- and b-monitoring, typically unequal, depends
on the state of the economy. Monitoring effort directed to control for misclassification of
bad risks (b-monitoring) is more effective at (the margin) in raising expected marginal
revenue than is a monitoring effort directed to reducing misclassification of good risks (a-
monitoring), if the perceived state of the economy is weak enough, i.e. l < l
o.
Though the return on monitoring is asymmetric in that it is more effective to try to
control the misclassification of bad risks when l is small, this does not dictate that the
bank would necessarily pay less attention to avoiding good risks. The optimal relative
monitoring intensities also depend on marginal costs. Indeed, the optimal mix (a
m,b
m) of
risk evaluation has to satisfy the first-order conditions given by (5a) and (5b)
 (5a)      -l[pL(RL + c) - (1+c)] = a'(a
m)
 (5b)      (1-l)[pH(RL + c) - (1+c)] = b'(b
m).
From (5a) and (5b) one can see that cost savings with respect to ex post monitoring
add to the returns on ex ante monitoring. Our Assumption 2 rules out the corner solution at
a = 0, b = 0. The other corner is also ruled out because at a = 1-l, b = l, marginal returns
are positive (for l < 1) while marginal costs are zero. We then definitively have an interior
solution characterized by (5a) and (5b). Moreover, the sufficient second-order conditions -
a''(a
m) < 0, -b''(b
m) < 0 are satisfied by Assumption 2. The optimal pair (a
m,b
m) is thus
determined by (5a)-(5b) through equality of marginal costs and expected marginal
revenues from monitoring efforts. We notice from (5a) and (5b) that the combination of
optimal monitoring intensities (a
m,b
m) satisfies
       b'(b
m)  =  a'(a
m) + (1-l)[pH(RL+c)-(1+c)] + l[pL(RL+c)-(1+c)]15
                  =  a'(a
m) + (RL+c)(pL-pH)[l-l
o].
This result provides an insightful characterization of the optimal monitoring intensities a
m
and b
m relative to each other. Though it is not yet quite sufficient to rank a
m and b
m
without parametrization of the a(.)- and b(.)-functions, we can see the central determinants
of the relative monitoring efforts: the marginal costs and the state of the economy. Even if
it were the case that the monitoring technologies, and hence the cost functions a(.) and
b(.), were identical, this would not imply that a = b, highlighting the importance of
introduction of both decision errors independently. We can conclude that for the optimal
combination of monitoring intensities it holds that a marginal relaxation of b-monitoring
will generate higher cost savings than a relaxation of a-monitoring if l < l
o.
If the bank does not monitor, it will finance either N projects or none, depending
on the value of l. With investments in project-specific monitoring, the number of projects
financed is changed to N[l(1-a
m) + (1-l)b
m]. We see that with monitoring, the number of
projects financed will typically differ from lN unless monitoring provides perfect
information. Thus, based on project-specific information arising from monitoring, the
bank will typically find it worthwhile to optimally adjust the number of projects financed.
There is, however, an asymmetry. The number of projects financed is negatively related to
the accepted classification error a
m, but positively to b
m.
We now want to find out more about the interaction between the proportion of
low-risk projects (l) and the optimal filter characteristics for the bank as measured by the
pair (a
m,b
m). We raise the question of how a monopoly bank adjusts its behavior with
respect to monitoring when its perception of the pool of loan applicants becomes more
optimistic. An expected change in the macroeconomic state of the economy, i.e. in the
perception of aggregate risks, may underlie such a change. Differentiating the system of
first-order conditions (5a) and (5b) with respect to l shows that
(6)      =   -
( p R -1)+( p -1)c
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Thus, we can state
Proposition 1.  An increased degree of optimism regarding the average quality of loan
applicants makes the (monopoly) bank more willing to accept classification errors in the
evaluation of bad risks. It makes the bank less willing to accept classification errors in the
evaluation of good risks, subject to the qualification that the ex post cost of monitoring is
not too high.
Thus, an increase in the proportion of low-risk applicants will cause the bank to
increase its monitoring efforts towards reduction of the probability that a profitable
applicant (L-type) would be denied credit. For a given value of a, such a misclassification
would be more costly when the proportion of good risk applicants increases. When it
comes to the positive impact of l on b an intuitive explanation goes as follows. When the
proportion of low-risk applicants increases the marginal expected return on those
classified as L increases for any given values of a and b. Thus the bank will have less
incentives to spend resources intended to reduce the probability of classifying a bad risk
applicant as a low-risk one.
Our interpretation of the impact of changes in the proportion of low-risk projects
on the monitoring intensities in terms of the business cycle framework is clearly simplistic
and somewhat far-fetched. Of course, to be complete and fully consistent with rational
expectations with respect to the underlying macroeconomic conditions (outside our model)
such interpretations would formally need a genuine dynamic model to exhibit cyclical
fluctuations. Our representation is, however, able to capture some of the basic qualitative
features which by necessity would also be present in more detailed models. The massive
(7)      =   -
p R -1+c( p -1)
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credit expansion during the prolonged boom in the late 1980s seems to have been a
striking feature, for example, of the recent banking crises in Scandinavia or the ongoing
crisis in Japan. Many observers have linked this to the significant increase in the
Scandinavian banks' credit losses with the failure of these banks to screen out bad risk
projects from the pool of potential customers. As we have seen, our model has been able
to predict and sort out the mechanism for lower monitoring effort during booms. To this
extent, a more liberal credit policy during booms in granting loans seems to be fully
consistent with rational behavior on behalf of banks. In light of our model, it seems to be
an inherent property of risk evaluation through the banking system that credit volumes will
be expanded during a boom. Our model will give rise to a testable prediction,
Corollary 1. With a switch to more optimistic macroeconomic conditions, the banks
find it worthwhile to expand the number of projects financed.
Proof. An expansion of the credit volume during booms can be shown in the context of
our model as follows. The volume of projects financed is measured by N[l(1-a
m) + (1-
l)b
m]. The marginal impact of a change in l on the number of projects financed is given
by
which is positive in the face of (6) and (7).                                      QED
So far our analysis has produced results on optimal monitoring by a bank
which does not face competition ("a monopoly bank"). We now direct our attention to the
implications of competition between banks when monitoring investments are used
strategically.       













V. Competition In Monitoring
Earlier, Riordan (1993) has explored the implications of more competition in loan
markets in the context of a screening model of lending suggesting that more competition
might make individual banks too conservative damaging market performance.
16 In order to
find out the implications of competition
17 in monitoring, we initially consider a banking
duopoly operating in an environment characterized as follows:  (i) all projectholders apply
for funding at both banks  (ii) both banks classify all loan applicants, which become
labelled as L or H; (iii) even though both banks would know the monitoring intensity of
their competitor, neither of them has access to information on the outcome of monitoring
undertaken by the rival. The important point is that competing banks recognize that their
commitments to monitoring will have spillover effects (externalities) on the expected profit
of the competitor. Absence of information sharing between the banks is most natural; if
anything, the banks would have incentives to misrepresent their private information to
their rival unless there exists an institution for verification of private bank reports. The
banks' monitoring decisions {ai, bi} therefore define a noncooperative game. In a banking
industry with multiple banks, all banks understand that each projectholder has the option
of being simultaneously and independently monitored by each bank. Of course, such
multiple monitoring constitutes a potential source of socially wasteful duplication.
Costless mobility of customers between lenders creates spillovers between the
banks with respect to the quality of customers. We study strategic monitoring choices of
independent banks and we assume that the banks have access to identical monitoring
technologies. The banks understand the mechanism that even if they were committed to a
relatively high monitoring effort, like that typical of a monopoly bank, the average quality
of their customers will be reduced under competition. This is inevitable; a positive
classification decision by one bank is sufficient for a project to get funded regardless of the
outcome of the screening undertaken by the other bank which has been convincingly
demonstrated already by Riordan (1993). Analogously, monitoring reduces the probability
that profitable projects are refused funding. In such a situation, banks' expected total
revenue from risky lending is somewhat more complicated and sensitive to the nature of19
banking competition.
In order to focus exclusively on the consequences of competition in
monitoring, we restrict ourselves to a general representation of lending rate competition. If
such a lending rate equilibrium R exists, it must satisfy
The lower bound of (9), Ro, represents the zero-profit condition at the stage of
lending rate competition while the upper bound corresponds to the case where the banks
are able to noncooperatively sustain lending rate collusion. In light of (9), our model
captures the outcome of a whole spectrum of patterns of lending rate competition. In the
context of competition in monitoring there are several justifications for focusing
particularly on cases with a high degree of collusion in lending rates. The existing
literature, in particular Broecker (1990) and Yanelle (1997), has already quite extensively
characterized lending rate equilibria under competition and explored the highly restrictive
circumstances under which the existence of an equilibrium can be guaranteed. Moreover,
it is reasonable to consider the reaction lags of banks to be short when it comes to lending
rate competition, in particular since lending rates, unlike monitoring commitments are
typically public and verifiable information. For that reason, banks might be much better
able to noncooperatively sustain collusion with respect to lending rates than with respect
to monitoring in the context of repeated competition.
18 Actually, both Yanelle (1997) and
Caminal and Matutes (1997) suggest reasons for why ruthless lending rate competition
may be ruled out. Especially for high degrees of collusion in lending rates, our results are
unambiguous. It is, however, a remarkable feature of our model that the results hold even
more generally and that they do not seem to be particularly sensitive to the nature of
lending rate competition prevailing.
We now proceed to formally analyze how competition in banking interacts with
the incentives to commit oneself to ex ante monitoring and how the risks the banks accept
in terms of misclassification of risky projects are affected by the market structure in the
(9)       
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lending market. When both banks are engaged in monitoring, each project will fall into
one of the following four categories: (i) those classified as L by both banks, (ii) those
classified as L by bank i, but as H by bank j, (iii) those classified as H by bank i, but as L
by bank j, and (iv) those classified as H by both banks. Bank i will not grant finance to
projects in groups (iii) or (iv). Further, bank i will be the only bank to offer credit to
projects belonging to group (ii). Both banks would be interested in funding the projects
belonging to group (i).
We first characterize the market share of bank i in a symmetric case of lending rate
competition
Lemma 3. In a symmetric equilibrium, the number of projects financed by bank i is given
by
              qi(ai,bi,aj,bj) = (1/2)N[l(1-ai)(1+aj)+(1-l)bi(2-bj)].
Proof. In case a projectholder is labelled as L, i.e. as a good risk, by both banks, we
assume the projectholder chooses a particular bank with a probability of 1/2. Thus, one can
find the number of projects financed by bank i, qi(ai,bi,aj,bj) by first evaluating the total
number of projects classified as good risk by bank i, and then subtracting half of those
projects classified as good risks by both banks. Thus, qi(ai,bi,aj,bj) = N[l(1-ai)+bi(1-l)]-
(1/2)Nl(1-ai)(1-aj)-(1/2)N(1-l)bibj. Simple algebra then gives Lemma 3.
                                                           QED
We also obtain the results that ¶qi/¶ai < 0, ¶qi/¶aj > 0, ¶qj/¶bi > 0, ¶qj/¶bj <
0. They all appeal to intuition.
In the absence of contractual arrangements between banks on information
sharing, the monitoring efforts must constitute best responses to each other. Thus, we
focus on the Nash equilibrium with respect to monitoring. Therefore, given {aj,bj}, the
optimal monitoring effort of bank i is obtained from the maximization problem21
 
where, to recall, Gi = pLti + pH(1-ti) stands for the posterior success probability for projects
classified as L by bank i. After some manipulation, the first-order conditions are found to
be
and
In (11a), we have introduced an auxiliary variable
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We note that conditions (11a) and (11b), which equate the expected
marginal revenues to marginal costs given the subsequent lending rate, R, include not only
the decision variables of bank i, but also those of the competitor j. These conditions
represent the reaction functions and they thereby constitute the mutually best responses.
We have chosen to introduce them in a form which facilitates comparison of the
monitoring intensities of a duopoly bank to those of a monopoly bank. From these
conditions, one can see in which way monitoring externalities arise when customers are
mobile. It is of particular interest to ask whether competition, and the inevitable sharing of
markets, reduces the incentives for monitoring when compared with the monitoring
decisions of a lender facing no competition. Intuitively, there are good reasons for such a
hypothesis. A duopoly bank is unable to capture all the good risk customers it would like
to finance, since those which have been detected as good risk projects by both banks will
be shared.
Below we provide a comparison of the monitoring incentives of a bank
facing competition with those of a bank not subject to competition. We assume throughout
that the outcome of monitoring remains private information and that there is no credible
way for the bank to commit itself to information sharing in that there is always an
incentive to misrepresent the quality of one's customers to the competitor. We state our
major results concerning this comparison as follows:
Proposition 2. (a-monitoring) Regardless of the intensity of the lending rate competition
prevailing, monitoring competition between banks undermines the incentives to control
good risks when compared to a bank operating in the absence of competition.
Proof. For the proof we compare the reaction function (11a) with the first-order condition
(5a). For a duopoly to monitor less (a
d > a
m) it is sufficient and necessary that its expected
revenue from a marginal reduction in monitoring effort exceeds that of the monopoly bank
given in (5a). In proving this claim, the usefulness of our auxiliary variable g becomes
evident.
Since23
it holds that (g/2) < 1 in (11a). Moreover, the second term on the left-hand side of (11a) is
always positive since otherwise it will not be profitable to finance projects classified as L
in the first place. The claim a
d > a
m then follows immediately.
19                              QED
Proposition 3. (b-monitoring) As long as lending rate competition is not too intensive,
monitoring competition between banks undermines the incentives to control bad risks
when compared to a bank operating in the absence of competition. 
Proof. For the proof we compare the reaction function (11b) with the first-order condition
(5b). For a duopoly to monitor less (b
d > b
m), it is sufficient and necessary that its expected
revenue from a marginal reduction in monitoring effort exceeds that of the monopoly bank
given in (5b). Subtracting (5b) from (11b) we find that
where we have denoted H = (pL-pH)(1-aj-bj)ti
2. We observe that the left-hand side of this
equation is a linear and increasing function of R. It can easily be seen that b
d > b
m if and
only if R > q where q is defined by the condition
(12)           q[(2-bj)pH + H] = 2pHRL - c[H + bj(1-pH)] - bj.
     min(1+ ,2- )  <  g  <  max(1+ ,2- ). j j j j a b a b
    (
1-
2
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l
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If the lending rate competition is not extremely intense, it always holds that
R > q which means that b
d > b
m. Only with parameter configurations such that q > Ro it
can happen that b
d < b
m once the additional requirement of sufficiently intense lending
rate competition is met.    QED
From Proposition 2, we can see that there is an unambiguous relationship
whereby competition will undermine the incentives for a-monitoring for all feasible
intensities of lending rate competition. Moreover, our Proposition 2 is a strong one in the
following sense: a monopoly bank is more concerned about misclassification of loan
applications independently of l, the state of the economy. Further, from the proof of the
Proposition 3, and as illustrated in Figures 1(A) and 1(B), we can conclude that the
difference between investments in b-monitoring by a lending monopolist and a lending
duopolist increases as a linear function of the prevailing duopoly rate. As long as the
degree of lending rate collusion of the banking duopoly is sufficiently large we know for
sure that a lending monopolist will maintain a higher quality in its b-monitoring than a
bank facing competition. In fact, for reasonable parameter configurations, illustrated by
Figure 1(A), such a relationship will hold for all feasible lending rates that can be
maintained by a banking duopoly. However, under sufficiently intense lending rate
competition, there are also plausible parameter combinations, exhibited in Figure 1(B),
such that a bank facing competition will sustain more conservative b-monitoring than a
lending monopolist. We illustrate these cases numerically below in Table 1.
           q                        q         Ro
     
      c = 0
        RL = 1.5             
          
         0.783         
       RL = 3
        
        1.623
    
     1.379
      c = 0.1                   0.734                  1.573      1.417
      c = 0.2                   0.684         1.524      1.455
      c = 0.4          0.585         1.424      1.531
Table 1. Numerical values of the threshold parameter q q defined by (12) and Ro defined
by (9). Assumptions: l l = 0.5, b bi = b bj = 0.05, a ai = a aj = 0.05, pL = 0.75, pH = 0.25.
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Thus, there will always be less b-monitoring under duopoly banking regardless of
the intensity of the lending rate competition when q < Ro. However, with sufficiently
severe interest rate competition, a duopoly bank will invest more in b-monitoring than a
monopoly bank if it holds that q > Ro. Such a case can be intuitively explained as follows.
A low lending margin forces the duopolist to carefully screen those projects to be funded.
It is not possible for such a duopolist to cover up for careless monitoring based on
substantial lending margin in such a way as the monopolist can when RL is "high". In fact,
a large interest rate differential RL-Ro is a necessary condition for there to be a possibility
of q > Ro occuring. Interestingly, as illustrated with RL = 3 (see the third column), our
calculations show that the ex post verification cost has a systematic impact on the
relationship between the market structure and monitoring. For example, under high ex post
verification cost it is the case that a monopoly will monitor more than a duopoly bank.
Consequently, we have identified a non-trivial and somewhat parameter-specific
relationship between the incentives for b-monitoring and the prevailing lending market
structure. In particular, we have shown how the nature of this relationship is systematically
affected by the lending rate competition. Our results thus differ qualitatively from those
obtained by Riordan (1993) who found that competition tends to make individual banks
more conservative in their lending decisions.




d stand for the decisions errors under duopoly. With reasonably small
decision errors, a banking duopoly tends to grant more credits than a banking monopoly.
Can we characterize the nature of the strategic interaction with respect to
monitoring? From (11a) we find, for example, that ¶ai/¶aj < 0, ¶ai/¶bj > 0. Therefore, to
make the competitor relax the monitoring intensity with respect to good risks, a bank itself
has to tighten its a-monitoring. The bank can also induce the competitor to relax its a-
monitoring by relaxing its own b-monitoring. In other words, as instruments of strategic
     N{ [ -( ) ] + (1- )[ (2- )- ]},
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competition, evaluations of good risks show up as strategic substitutes while evaluation of
bad risks exhibits strategic complementarity relative to the competitor's evaluation of good
risks.
To recall, Sah and Stiglitz (1986) have earlier analyzed the internal organization of
agencies for project selection. In that respect, they have shown that the screening in a
polyarchy is more conservative than that in a hierarchy. In contrast to their model, we have
focused on the relationship between monitoring and the external market structure in our
characterization how competition typically undermines (with the qualifications stated) the
incentives of lenders to avoid decision errors of both types.
VI. Does Monopoly Generate Socially Optimal Monitoring?
Above we have derived a rather strong result concerning the devastating impact of
banking competition on the incentives for project-specific monitoring with free mobility of
customers subject to the qualification that lending rate competition is not too intense. A
striking implication is that the absence of competition in monitoring makes the banking
industry better able to finance those projects which are socially valuable while leaving
excessively risky projects without financing. Subject to the stated qualification of
Proposition 3, competition in lending markets systematically deteriorates banks' ability to
fulfill the socially fundamental role as producers of project-specific information in risk
markets. Thus, the social gains from competition typical of ordinary industries, seem to be
more controversial when it comes to considering financial intermediaries. Competition
reduces the incentives for ex ante monitoring, thereby increasing the risk of funding
projects which are not socially valuable.
Thus, it is of substantial interest to address the issue of what type of market
structure is socially optimal from the point of view of the banking industry as a producer
of project-specific information in risk markets. To the best of our knowledge, this
important question has not been thoroughly analyzed in the literature. Riordan (1993) has
addressed normative issues from a different angle. In the context of an auction for projects,
his analysis suggests that an increase in bad loans resulting from more competition may
have an overwhelming negative effect on welfare.28
We will evaluate the expected social surplus (welfare) generated under different
industrial structures of the lending market. Since our model has endogenized the
classification errors, minimizing the social costs of both types of errors is not sufficient as
a welfare criterion. In our context, the criterion has to be adjusted for the cost of obtaining
the desired errors.
A natural welfare measure can thus be obtained by subtracting the initial project
investment, the expected cost of project failure, and the ex ante monitoring expenditures
from the expected return of successful projects. Under a lending market characterized by
monopoly, the expected social surplus is given by
while the expected social surplus associated with an industry consisting of two identified
competing lenders is
Note that (12b) takes into account that each project would be evaluated by two
independent lenders. As the benchmark for our welfare analysis, we refer to the socially
optimal intensities (a*,b*) as those solving
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Thus, (13c) formalizes the objective function of a fictitious "social planner". An
important observation is that (4) and (13c) are identical except for the feature that RH
replaces RL in (4). Intuitively, the objective function of the monopoly bank differs from
that of the social planner only because in the current context the monopoly bank is
concerned about how the surplus generated by the project is distributed while the planner
need not pay attention to the distribution. We now proceed by asking the unusual question
focusing on what "distortions" in ex ante monitoring are caused by duopoly competition
when compared to monitoring conducted by a lending monopoly. Firstly, with competition
there will be duplication of monitoring effort which involves elements of social waste.
Secondly, the expected social return on each project financed by a duopoly will be lower
than that financed by a monopoly. Namely, the probability that firms classified as L indeed
are of type L is smaller under lending market duopoly than under monopoly, t
d < t
m. Thus,
a duopoly finances projects of lower average quality than a monopoly, regardless of the
number of projects financed, which typically is increased as we have shown.
We next report the following result which is important from the normative
point of view,
Proposition 4. (i) A monopoly bank provides the socially optimal evaluation of good risk
projects (a-monitoring), but it is too conservative in its evaluation of bad risks (b-
monitoring), resulting in too few projects being funded. (ii) A duopoly bank always invests
too little in evaluation of good risk projects (a-monitoring), and its investment in b-
monitoring is also socially insufficient as long as the duopoly banks can exploit a
sufficiently large share of the return on high risk projects (RH/R sufficiently close to one).
(13c)     N[ (1- )+(1- ) ][ p ( R +c)+(1- ) p ( R +c)-(1+ , L L H H a b l a l b t t max
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Proof. Using (12c), the first-order conditions for socially optimal monitoring read as
Comparing to the conditions (5a)-(5b) and (11a)-(11b) proves the claims.
                                                                    QED
Proposition 4 states that a monopoly bank will provide a socially optimal amount of a-
monitoring. The reason for this striking result is that the return on successful bad risk
projects does not play any role in the determination of the socially optimal a-monitoring.
Consequently, the difference between the objective functions of a monopoly bank and of a
planner does not matter for the monitoring intensity of good risks. From Proposition 2 we
already know that introduction of competition into the monopoly market will reduce the
monitoring incentives and consequently a banking duopoly will achieve an a-monitoring
intensity which is insufficient from the social point of view. Consequently, competition in
a-monitoring will lead to a failure of banks to evaluate good risks efficiently.
From Proposition 4 we find the monopoly bank to be too conservative in its
evaluation of bad risks, because, in contrast to the planner, it is not indifferent about the
distribution of the project surplus. Introduction of competition into a monopoly lending
market gives rise to two types of welfare costs. Firstly, the average quality of funded
projects is deteriorated; secondly, each project is subject to multiple monitoring. As long
as the return ratio RH/R is not too far from unity, we know for sure that the b-monitoring
undertaken by bank duopolists will be insufficient from the social point of view. Thus,
while the monopoly engages in excessive b-monitoring, under the condition stated the
duopoly banks underinvest in bad risk evaluation relative to the social optimum.
Importantly, Proposition 4 suggests a welfare-improving role for coordination of
monitoring activities of competing banks. By delegating their monitoring activities to a
(14a)    - [ p ( R +c)-(1+c)]-a ( *) =  0 L L l a ¢
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jointly operated institution for credit evaluation, it would be possible for a banking
duopoly to exploit the stronger monitoring incentives of a banking monopoly. By so
doing, the banking duopoly would achieve cost savings. Such a jointly operated institution
could be organized, for example, in a way analogous to an R&D-cartel (see Kamien,
Muller and Zang (1992)). Within the framework of our model, such a jointly operated
institution for credit evaluation would generate unambiguous welfare gains relative to
noncooperative monitoring competition.
In light of the striking results above, it is obvious that our model has abstracted
from some potential benefits of competition in a more general sense. For example, the
stylized restriction to two types of fixed-size projects implies that a lower lending rate
achieved through competition between banks would not expand the number and size of
socially worthwhile projects undertaken.
VII. Concluding Comments
It is one of the key questions in financial economics whether risk markets function
efficiently so that funds get allocated to risky projects in the socially optimal way. Our
analysis has suggested that banking competition may result in socially inefficient ex ante
monitoring effort by the banks with regard to screening of risky projects.
The issue of social efficiency is, however, rather complicated when financial
intermediaries are concerned. Most of the literature has been based on an implicit
assumption of riskless deposits with full insurance or unlimited liability. Moreover, many
private projects have external effects. Of course, if projects yield social benefits exceeding
the private ones, the monitoring investments also of the monopoly bank would be distorted
from the socially optimal levels. Public intervention in controlling the banking industry
may be needed, but in light of our analysis, it has to be justified by inefficiencies in
banking competition and reasons related to differences between private and social benefits
from risky projects. De Meza and Webb (1988) have earlier addressed optimal public
intervention in credit markets in the presence of screening costs by concentrating on tax
policy applied to interest income. Our model suggests that public intervention in credit
markets could also focus on policies applied to the expenditures for project-specific32
monitoring. In principle, we see no reason for not applying the general principles of
industrial policy with respect to banks' investments in project-specific monitoring.
The present model can best be regarded as a step towards understanding the
mechanisms and implications of optimal project-specific monitoring. We consider the
present model particularly promising as a basis for exploring the relationship between the
incentives of banks for costly information acquisition based on ex ante monitoring efforts
and the market structure of the banking industry. One can expect that competitive
pressures lead to underproduction of information so that competition might be socially
inefficient from the point of view of information acquisition. There would thus be a trade-
off between the degree of banking competition and the incentives for banks to acquire
information. Our analysis points to a welfare-improving role of incentive-compatible
institutional arrangements making banks share information.33
 NOTES
1. In Norway, Finland and in Sweden, substantial support from the taxpayers has been
inevitable to keep the banking system operating in order to protect depositors from
losses. According to Koskenkylä (1995), the credit losses of the Finnish banks
amounted on average to 2.2% of GNP during the period 1989-94 and they reached the
peak level of 4.6% in 1992. In Sweden and in Norway, the banking crises were only
slightly less severe, credit losses as a percentage of GNP reaching on average 2.1% and
1.7%, respectively, during 1989-94.
2. Cf. van Damme's (1994) survey of the area or Freixas and Rochet (1997) suggesting
where the limits to the understanding of banks stand today. Dewatripont and Tirole
(1994) have extensively developed the implications for regulation of banking.
3. Kanniainen and Södersten (1994) claimed that banks and shareholders share the costs of
monitoring whereby the costs born by the bank are taken up in the interest on corporate
debt.
4. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to the relationship
between our analysis and that of Sah and Stiglitz (1986).
5. Customers started actively to search for competing credit offers from different banking
groups and banks started to compete by the "speed" of customer evaluation.
6. Collateral functions like a substitute for monitoring. Perfect collateral, of course, would
completely eliminate completely the need for monitoring ex ante, but the need to
monitor remains under imperfect collateral. Collateral would, however, interfere with
the project choice by the customer. In order to analyze the interaction between
imperfect collateral and monitoring, one would need a more complicated return
structure (like in Bester (1985)) than what we have introduced here. Such a framework
which is in the focus of the promising analysis of Manove, Padilla and Pagano (1998)
is, however, unnecessary for the purposes of our paper.
7. The introduction of imperfect deposit insurance would lead to a dramatic change in
focus. The depositors would demand a risk-premium and the investment in ex ante
monitoring would provide the bank with a costly instrument for signaling its type (risk)
to depositors.
8. One could extend the information production of a bank to include evaluation of the
aggregate risks, i.e. uncertainty about l. Such an extension could also provide
important elements for a theory of the distinction between local banks with a
comparative advantage in monitoring local customer-specific risks and global (national
or international) banks with a comparative advantage in the assessment of
nondiversifiable aggregate risks.
9. It is natural to view the choice of monitoring technology to be analogous to a choice34
under putty-clay conditions. When the investment is made, the bank has the possibility
of choosing the average precision of its credit evaluation and this with an increasing
cost. After such a commitment has been made, each project evaluation is assumed to
take place at zero marginal cost.
10. Of course, all credit applications are in practice subject to some review. Monitoring
costs amount to the office space, computers, the wage cost of managers and clerks, etc.
In addition to the routine review, investment loans are reviewed by specialists, hired by
banks for that particular purpose. The degree of ex ante monitoring is related to the
economic significance of the loan application and the procedure may vary from case to
case. Firms often have to release their inside information to the bank including full
description of their accounts and their investment plans. The bank then runs a
standardized analysis of the quality of the firm based on historical data and evaluates
the future of the firm before the decision to finance the project is ultimately made.
11. It follows that in the absence of monitoring, P(L‰L) = l, P(H‰H) = 1 - l. Substituting
a0 and b0 from above into (2) restates this result; without monitoring, the probability
that a projectholder classified as good risk, L, actually is of type L is given by t0 =
t(a0,b0) = l, while the probability that an applicant classified as bad risk, H, actually is
of type H is given by r0 = r(a0,b0) = 1-l.
12. The result that a standard debt contract is incentive-compatible under costly state
verification has been established by Townsend (1979), Gale-Hellwig (1985) and
Williamson (1987). For a survey, see also Allen and Winton (1995).
13. In terms of c, a precise condition for l
o < 1 reads as c < (RLpL-1)/(1-pL), which does
not contradict with the optimality condition of the debt contract derived above.
14. We note that this type of phenomenon was first identified by Akerlof (1970) in his
famous example of the market for lemons.
15. We use the superscript m to refer to case of a "monopoly" bank.
16. Riordan's argument follows from the risk of "winner's curse". Riordan models lending
competition making use of the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of a common value auction.
Our framework differs from that of Riordan (1993) in several ways: Riordan assumes
that the signal is costless while in our model is it costly and its precision is the choice
variable.
17. Our model will abstract from several important aspects of lending market
characteristics. It is restricted to interbank competition between lenders in the absence
of competitive pressure created by external equity markets. For a pioneering analysis in
this direction, we refer to the recent work by Boot and Thakor (1997). They also
address the issue of "relationship banking" which our paper will not discuss.
18. Note that lending rate regulation has been a prevalent feature of the banking industry
until the recent wave of deregulation. As a regulatory instrument, interest rates might be
more important than monitoring investments because interest rates represent public and35
verifiable information.
19. There are good reasons to highlight that we have been able to prove this qualitative
result resorting only to the best response functions of a bank duopolist and without
explicitly solving for the actual Nash equilibrium.
20. It should be pointed out that ai and aj as well as bi and bj are the endogenous variables
of our analysis. Through a suitable choice of monitoring technologies (monitoring cost
functions) the classification errors which we have selected can always be achieved.36
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